Consciousness and Theory of Mind: a Common Theory? by Sebastián, Miguel Ángel
 THEORIA 31/1 (2016): 73-89
1Consciousness and Theory of Mind: a Common Theory?*
Miguel Ángel Sebastián
Received: 04/03/2015
Final Version: 25/08/2015
BIBLID 0495-4548(2016)31:1p.73-89
DOI: 10.1387/theoria.14091
ABSTRACT: Many have argued that the difference between phenomenally conscious states and other kind of states lies 
in the implicit self-awareness that conscious states have. Higher-Order-Representationalist (HOR) theories at-
tempt to explain such self-awareness by means of higher-order representation. Consciousness depends on our 
capacity to represent our own mental states: our Theory of Mind. It is generally agreed that such an ability can 
be decomposed into another two: mindreading and metacognition. 
 I will argue that consciousness cannot depend on mindreading. The tenability of HOR theories depends, 
therefore, on the relation between mindreading and metacognition. I analyze several views on such a relation 
and argue that none of them seem to be a plausible option for HOR theories.
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RESUMEN: Muchos han argumentado que la diferencia entre estados fenoménicamente conscientes y otros tipos de es-
tados reside en la auto-conciencia implícita que muchos estados conscientes poseen. Las Teorías de la Represen-
tación de Orden Superior (HOR) pretenden explicar esa auto-conciencia mediante representaciones de orden 
superior. La conciencia depende de nuestra capacidad de representar nuestros propios estados mentales: nues-
tra Teoría de la Mente. Se acepta en general que esta capacidad puede descomponerse en otras dos: la lectura de 
mentes y la meta-cognición. 
 Argumentaré que la conciencia no puede depender de la lectura de mentes. La sostenibilidad de las teorías 
HOR depende, por tanto, de la relación entre la lectura de mentes y la meta-cognición. Analizo algunas con-
cepciones de esa relación y argumento que ninguna de ellas parece ser una opción plausible para las teorías 
HOR.
Palabras clave: conciencia, auto-conciencia, teorías de orden superior, teoría de la mente, lectura de mentes, meta-cogni-
ción.
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1. Introduction
Many of our mental states are phenomenally conscious. It feels a certain way, or bor-
rowing Nagel’s expression, there is something it is like to be in these states. Examples 
of phenomenally conscious states are those one typically undergoes while looking at the 
ocean or at a red apple, drinking a glass of scotch or a tomato juice, smelling coffee or 
the perfume of a lover, listening to the radio or a symphonic concert, or feeling pain or 
hunger.
A theory of consciousness has to explain the distinctive properties that phenomenally 
conscious states have and other kind of states lack. Many have thought that this difference 
rests upon the implicit self-awareness that conscious states have. Higher-Order Representa-
tional (HOR) theories1 attempt to provide this kind of explanation.2 HOR theorists share 
the idea that a conscious state is a state that I am aware of being in—states we are com-
pletely unaware of do not count as conscious states—and unpack such an awareness as one 
form or other of representation. So, according to these theories, phenomenally conscious 
states are those that are the objects of some kind of higher-order process or representation. 
There is something higher-order, a meta-state, in the case of phenomenal conscious mental 
states, which is lacking in the case of other kind of states. This higher-order state represents 
(is about/is directed on to) the first-order state, which thereby becomes phenomenally con-
scious. Hence, according to HOR theories, consciousness depends on our capacity to rep-
resent our own mental states: consciousness depends on our Theory of Mind.
A Theory of Mind, henceforth ToM, is the ability of humans to identify their own 
mental states and attribute mental states different from their own to others. It is gener-
ally agreed that such an ability can, at least conceptually, be decomposed into another two: 
mindreading and metacognition.
Human beings are able to entertain representations of other people’s mental states 
thanks to their mindreading ability. We attribute beliefs, perceptions, feelings or desires to 
other people and predict and explain their behavior accordingly. But we also, frequently, 
attribute mental states to ourselves. This kind of first-person access to our mental states is 
usually called ‘metacognition’.
My purpose in this paper is to present a problem for HOR theories of consciousness 
by showing that the claim that phenomenal consciousness depends on a ToM is not plausi-
ble. HOR theorists seem to be committed to the claim that phenomenal consciousness de-
pends on metacognition. Besides, some philosophers have maintained that it depends on 
our mindreading capacities. In section 2, I will argue against this latter claim. If my objec-
tion is sound, the tenability of a HOR theory would depend on the relation between mind-
reading and metacognition. I analyze several views on such a relation in section 3 and argue 
that none of them seem to be a plausible option for HOR theories.
1 See, for instance, Amstrong (1968); Carruthers (2000); Gennaro (2012); Lycan (1996); Rosenthal 
(1997); Rosenthal (2005).
2 It is controversial how to better characterize such self-awareness and whether HOR theories can pro-
vide a satisfactory account of it—see for example Kriegel (2003, 2009), Sebastian (2012), Zahavi 
(2005, 2006). In this paper I would like to remain neutral on this topic and present an independent 
problem for HOR theories. 
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2. Phenomenal Consciousness and Mindreading
HOR theories of consciousness try to explain what is for a state to be conscious by means 
of an awareness of that state (Rosenthal 2012). Such awareness is then unpacked as some 
form or other of higher-order representation of it. HOR theories commonly claim that a 
conscious mental state is the object of a higher-order representation of some kind.
The kind of representation that is required by the theory makes a basic difference among 
HOR theories. The main concern is whether higher-order states are belief-like or percep-
tion-like. The former are called Higher-Order Thought (HOT) theories (Gennaro 1996; 
Gennaro 2012; Rosenthal 1997; Rosenthal 2005) and the latter Higher-Order Perception 
(HOP) or ‘inner-sense’ theories (Amstrong 1968; Carruthers 2000; Lycan 1996). Accord-
ing to the former theories, when I undergo a phenomenally conscious experience as of red I 
am in a mental state with certain content. Call this content ‘red*’. For this mental state to be 
phenomenally conscious, there has to be, additionally, a higher-order thought targeting it, 
whose content is something like ‘I see red*’. On the other hand, HOP theories maintain that 
what is required is a (quasi-) perceptual state directed on to the first-order one. A second 
point of disagreement is whether a given state is conscious in virtue of its being actually the 
target of a higher-order representation (Gennaro 2012; Rosenthal 1997; Rosenthal 2005) or 
by the disposition to raise a higher-order representation (C arruthers 2000). Carruther’s dis-
positionalist theory is the initial target of this paper.3
As we have seen, according to HOR theories, beings lacking metacognition lack 
thereby phenomenal consciousness, because the ability to represent our own mental state is 
a necessary condition for consciousness.4 Carruthers (2000) further claims that the ability 
of mindreading is required.5
3 It is worth mentioning a distinction between what Block (2011) calls ‘ambitious’ and ‘moderate’ 
HOR theories. The former “purse to capture what-it-is-likeness”, they attempt to provide a theory of 
phenomenal consciousness; the latter purpose to capture other kind of consciousness, “consciousness 
in one sense of the term, higher-order consciousness”. Block thinks that Lycan’s theory is probably a 
moderate one. However, most HOR theorists clearly endorse an ambitious one, as it is clear in the case 
of Rosenthal (2005), Carruthers (2003) or Gennaro (2012) and explicitly stated by Rosenthal (2011) 
or Weisberg (2011). In this paper I am interested in phenomenal consciousness and hence considering 
only “ambitious” theories.
4 Rosenthal has recently defended (2012) that metacognition and the postulated higher-order represen-
tation has little in common beyond the fact that they both postulate higher-order psychological states. 
He convincingly argues that not all metacognition is a higher-order representation of the postulated 
kind. However, he provides no argument against the claim that higher-order representation requires 
the kind of metacognition I mentioned.
5 Some philosophers consider this to be a reason for rejecting these theories. They are too demanding, 
for they require a mindreading faculty and most animals and arguably human babies lack it—though 
mindreading abilities have been recently demonstrated in corvids and canids (Bugnyar and Heinrich 
2006; Hare and Tomasello 2005; Stulp et al. 2009; Udell et al. 2008). I do not consider this last point 
to be a defeating one. Maybe animals and babies lack phenomenally conscious states after all. Although 
intuitively they undergo conscious experiences, I can only be sure that I do have conscious mental 
states and I have no serious doubts that so does the reader. I do not think that a theory that maintains 
that animals and babies are non-conscious is immediately wrong. Surely, when comparing alternative 
theories, one that doesn’t have this consequence is to be preferred.
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The insight of Carruthers’ theory is that phenomenal consciousness is a matter of 
how things seem to us. This, in turn, depends on there being a distinction between how 
things are and how things seem to us. This distinction is a product of our mindread-
ing capacity. As stated by Carruthers, some of the first-order perceptual states acquire, 
at the same time, a higher-order content by virtue of its availability to the mindread-
ing faculty combined with the truth of some version of ‘consumer semantics’ (Millikan 
1984; Milli kan 1989; Papineau 1993; Peacocke 1995). Very roughly, the main idea of 
consumer semantics is that the content of a mental state depends on the powers of the 
system which “consumes” that state; for instance, what a state represents will depend on 
the kind of inferences the cognitive system is prepared to make in the presence of that 
state. Certain mental states are recognized as mental representations by the mindread-
ing faculty and it is in virtue of their availability to this faculty, as a consumer system, 
that the perceptual states in question acquire a dual content. These states are phenom-
enally conscious states:
It is in virtue of the availability of first-order perceptual contents to a mind-reading system 
which understands the is–seems distinction and/or contains recognitional concepts of experi-
ence, that all of those first-order contents are, at the same time, higher-order ones... Each phe-
nomenally conscious experience has its distinctive form of subjectivity by virtue of acquiring a 
higher-order analog content which precisely mirrors, and represents as subjective, its first-order 
content. (ibid. p. 243)6
Our evolutionary ancestors would have had first-order representational concepts for many 
features of the environment (RED, GREEN, etc.); then the development of a mindreading 
faculty would have allowed them to build up an is-seems distinction: a distinction between 
how things are and how things seem to us. The concepts produced by the mindreading 
faculty could make use of first-order representations and these higher-order recognitional 
concepts (SEEMS RED, SEEMS GREEN, etc.) could have been generated in response to 
the very same perceptual data that gave rise to the first-order concepts. This way, each ex-
perience would, at the same time, be a representation of some state of the world (for exam-
ple, a representation as of red) and a representation of the fact that we are undergoing just 
such an experience (a representation of seems red), through the consumer system that is the 
mindreading faculty. This new content, seems red, is a by-product of a mindreading faculty, 
which builds up the is/seems distinction. In having an experience as of red, besides there be-
ing a first order representation of redness, there is also second-order representation of seem-
ing-redness.
6 Carruthers draws the distinction between beliefs and perception by appealing to that between analog 
and digital content:
[Perceptions] while perhaps being imbued with concepts (often or always), contain representations more 
fine-grained than any concept; these representations are analog. (ibid. p. 133)
 Nothing from what I will discuss in this paper hinges on the details of the distinction between digital 
and analog content.
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Carruthers introduces an interesting proposal defending HOR theories of conscious-
ness:
The explanation of phenomenal consciousness which I am putting forward, then, claims that 
it is because the content of C is available to two sets of consumers—first order conceptual reason-
ing systems, as well as a higher-order mind-reading faculty—that those contents actually (categor-
ically) have dual representational status. (ibid. p. 246)
A conscious mental state has a double content (is/seems) due to its availability to these two 
systems. The second content, provided by the mindreading ability, plays the role of explain-
ing the differential features of phenomenal consciousness. This proposal, while compelling, 
faces, I think, a serious objection.
2.1. Phenomenal Consciousness does not depend on Mindreading
My purpose in this section is to show the implausibility of a theory of consciousness accord-
ing to which having a phenomenally conscious experience depends on our mindreading abil-
ities.7 The reason is that phenomenal consciousness is a necessary condition for the attribu-
tion to others of mental states that feel some way or other, which is part of our mindreading 
ability. This objection may be extended to any HOR theory that makes mindreading prior 
to metacognition. In other words, either metacognition is prior to, or an independent mech-
anism from, mindreading, or higher-order theories face serious problems. In the next sec-
tion, I will argue that these last options are not very plausible assuming the truth of HOR 
theories. Let me focus here on the relation between consciousness and mindreading.
When we mindread we attribute mental states to others. That is to say, we represent 
others as having mental states. Such mental state attribution legitimates certain evalua-
tions: it has correctness conditions. Imagine the following situation with two subjects Sy 
and Sn. Sn is at home, lying on the couch drinking a beer, when Sy arrives. After saying 
hello and leaving the wallet on the table, Sy goes to the kitchen and open the fridge. A mo-
ment later, Sy comes back to the living room, looks at Sn, takes the wallet and leaves the 
flat. Sn thinks that Sy is mad at her because she took the last beer and Sy wanted to have 
one. Sn also thinks that Sy left the flat to go to buy beers. In this episode, Sn explains Sy’s 
behaviour by attributing her certain beliefs and desires. Such mental state attribution can 
be evaluated for correctness. Sn’s belief that Sy wants a beer is true or correct if Sy has the 
desire to have a beer and incorrect or false otherwise (imagine that Sy was just checking in 
the fridge whether there are the ingredients that she need for the pie she wants to prepare 
and she doesn’t feel at all like having a beer because she wants to continue working).
Are conscious experiences required for such a mindreading faculty? My opponent 
would argue that they are not; for example, along these lines: creatures can see objects in 
the environment and the response of other organisms to those objects and their properties 
in different circumstances. Different properties cause different responses in different crea-
tures. On that basis, organisms (through evolution) can come to theorize that there are in-
ternal states inside of other creatures that track particular properties and conditions. This 
mindreading faculty allows Sn, for example, to attribute Sy the desire to have a beer.
7 Carruthers (2009) seems to take feelings as inputs for a mindreading ability.
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Consider now the case of an attribution of a perceptual state, like the one Sn attributes 
when Sy opens the fridge. Sn believes that Sy is seeing the empty fridge. According to my 
opponent, when people attribute to others sensory states, there is no reason for attributing 
feelings, we just attribute to them states that track certain properties. Sn would be attribut-
ing Sy a state that tracks certain properties of the fridge without any need to attribute her 
any phenomenally conscious experience.
This kind of mental state attribution is very different from the kind we often do, for 
we often attribute conscious experiences. Beyond such a common sense observation, em-
pirical evidence for the claim that we do attribute phenomenally conscious states to others 
can be found, for example, in a study by Gray et al. (2007). The authors of this study distin-
guish two kinds of mental state attributions related to Experience—like hunger, fear, pain, 
pleasure, etc.—and others related to what they call ‘Agency’—which includes self-control, 
morality, memory and emotion recognition. Participants in the experiment compare sev-
eral characters (e.g., God, a fetus, a frog, a complex robot, a corpse) on a range of mental ca-
pacities. For example, participants were asked “whether a girl of 5 is more or less likely to 
feel pain than is a chimpanzee” (ibid. p. 619). Interestingly for our purposes, they found 
a strong correlation between attributions of experiences together with a poor correlation 
with the other group. For instance, while a human baby scored low on Agency abilities, she 
scored high on experience abilities and a complex robot scored very low on having experi-
ences, but had a moderate Agency. The correctness conditions of conscious experiences at-
tribution seems to concern the phenomenal character of our own experiences. The ques-
tion is, how can one ascribe others with mental states that feel a certain way for the subject 
if one has never been in a mental state that feels?8 It seems to me that the kind of mental 
state attribution that a normal subject who hasn’t undergone the relevant experience does 
would be completely different in this case.9 Let me illustrate the idea with an example.
Cases like pain or orgasm attribution are particularly illustrative for my case. Imag-
ine that Sn has never had an orgasm in her life whereas Sy had. However, Sn and Sy seem 
to be equally good in recognizing, given their behavioral response, whether their partners 
are feeling pleasure in sex or just faking. One day, Sn and Sy decide to share the night with 
Sx. When Sx starts to moan, both Sn and Sy attribute her a mental state that they would 
8 Recall that I am using the expression ‘states that feel a certain way’ as synonymous of ‘states such that 
there is something it is like for the subject to be in’. Some defender of Higher-Order theories might ob-
ject that there is a legitimate use of ‘feel’ according to which there are sensory and perhaps emotional 
states, which folk psychologically we describe as feelings (corresponding to what Rosenthal calls ‘qual-
itative states’) but such that there is nothing it is like to be in them and that I am, therefore, begging 
the question against her position. This would be a misunderstanding of the point I am trying to make 
here, because there is just a terminological disagreement about the use of the term ‘feeling’. If there is 
such a legitimate use—or is the correct one, which I doubt—, then the subject can have a feeling with-
out this feeling being conscious in the phenomenal sense; i.e., in the sense of there being something it 
is like to be in this state (other forms of consciousness are not relevant in this dispute for recall that I 
am just considering “ambitious” HOR theories and therefore there is nothing it is like to be in a quali-
tative state; see fn. 3). My claim can be straightforwardly restated in terms of phenomenally conscious 
states, which is what it was meant by states that feel a certain way.
9 This is independent of whether my ascription of mental states to myself or others is due to a simula-
tion theory or purely theoretical. I will say more on the distinction between simulation theory and the-
ory-theory in the next section. 
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express by saying “Sx is having an orgasm”. Are they attributing the same kind of mental 
state? They do not. To see why this is so, we have to look for the correctness conditions of 
their respective attributions and see whether they are the same ones. It seems obvious that 
in their attribution they both attribute a phenomenally conscious state: if being in Sx’s 
state doesn’t feel a certain (pleasurable) way, then their state attribution would be wrong. 
But, Sy is not merely attributing to Sx a state that feels (pleasurable) but a state that feels 
relevantly similar to her own orgasms: Sy attribution is correct if Sx’s state feels relevantly 
similar to hers and false otherwise.
This kind of mental state attribution is not possible in the case of Sn because she has 
never had and orgasm. To remark that this is the case, imagine that two weeks ago, Sn 
tasted a new gourmet chocolate; as a result she got goose pimples and she let a moan go. 
This was the most pleasurable experience she had never had and she comes to believe that 
orgasms must be similar experiences. In these circumstances, Sn might be attributing to Sx 
a mental state which is relevantly similar to her tasting chocolate experience. One day, Sn 
has an orgasm for the first time. Now, the kind of experience she will be attributing to oth-
ers when having an orgasm is different from the one attributed before she felt an orgasm 
for that first time. She knows how it feels to have an orgasm and will attributes to others a 
similar sensation when they are having one. In particular, she will maintain that Sx was not 
undergoing the kind of episode she was attributing to her in the previous example.
This example suggests that the kind of mental state attributions that someone that 
lacks phenomenal consciousness can do, in case she can, are different from the ones that 
I can do. If this is right, then phenomenal consciousness cannot depend on mindreading 
capacities, for phenomenal consciousness is prior, at least to certain, mindreading capaci-
ties; in particular, to our capacity to attribute conscious experiences. We attribute to oth-
ers phenomenally conscious mental states and this kind of attribution is not possible unless 
one has undergone the relevant experience, as the example suggests.
Before moving on to discuss the relation between mindreading a metacognition, let me 
make some clarifications to be clear about the scope and the assumptions of the argument 
and consider some possible objections.
2.2. Some Clarifications and Objections
There is something in my argument that might seem to resemble the reasoning in the well 
known Knowledge Argument (Jackson 1982). Mandik (2010) argues that the acceptance 
(explicit or not) of what he calls the ‘Experience Requirement’—the “thesis that, for some 
experiences at least, and red [orgasm] experiences in particular, knowledge of what it’s like 
to have such an experience requires that the knower has had or is currently having such an 
experience” (pp. 233-234; see also Papineau 1999; Stoljar 2005; Tye 1999)—is the most 
plausible support of Jackson’s knowledge argument in favor of an epistemic gap. If my ar-
gument depends upon the truth of this principle, it might be subject to the same objections 
that have been offered to the knowledge argument.
In reply it has to be noted, as Mandik does, that most materialist (what he dubs “gappy-
materialist” or type-b materialist in Chalmers’ (2003b) terminology) accept an epistemic 
gap but deny the ontological one. Interestingly for current purposes, this form of material-
ism is held by most higher-order theorists like Carruthers’ (Carruthers and Veillet 2007); 
Rosenthal (2005), for example, denies that the transitivity principle—the principle that a 
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conscious state is one I am conscious of myself as being in—that backs up HOR theories is 
a conceptual necessity, and he thinks that it rather derives from our folk psychological no-
tion of consciousness.10 Consequently, it seems reasonable to assume that my opponent is 
happy to accept something along the lines of the Experience Requirement, for she does not 
endorse a form of a priori physicalism and this assumption is not problematic. However, 
my argument does not require the Experience Requirement to be true but rather some-
thing much weaker, for it is a claim about the way in which we make such attributions.11
The argument does not require a commitment to the claim that it is not possible to 
attribute the very same kind of mental state without having undergone the relevant expe-
rience. If, for example, experiences E were identical to such-and-such brain activity, by at-
tributing you such-and-such brain activity—say by means of a neural image—I might be at-
tributing you experience E, independently of whether I have undergone experience E. But 
such an attribution would not be done by means of the machinery that constitutes my mind-
reading faculty and therefore it is not in tension with the claim that attributions of experi-
ence by means of mindreading faculty require phenomenal consciousness. Moreover, I am 
also happy to concede the (conceptual or even nomological) possibility of what Mandik 
calls ‘deviant subjects’ (see also Dennet 2007), subject who know what it is like to see red 
despite not having undergone the relevant experience. Mandik argues against the Experi-
ence Requirement by considering Swamp Mary, a microphysical duplicate of post-experi-
ential Mary, who, he claims, has phenomenal knowledge. I am happy to accept that deviant 
subjects can make mental state attributions in spite of the fact that they have not under-
gone any relevant experience. Again, my argument does not intend to show that having the 
experience is the only way we can gain phenomenal knowledge (and this is what the knowl-
edge argument seems to require), just that this is the way we, ordinary subjects, acquire the 
knowledge required for our mindreading capacities. And the denial of this is a commit-
ment of my opponent’s proposal, as I have shown.12 In a nutshell, phenomenal conscious-
ness cannot be a by-product of our mindreading capacities, precisely because our mindread-
ing capacities require phenomenally conscious mental states.
Finally, let me stress that I am not denying that there are certain mental state attribu-
tions that an ordinary person can make in spite of the fact that she has never undergone the 
experience. Consider a born-blind person. If I utter ‘there is a red object in the table’, she 
will understand—at least to some extend—my utterance and probably attribute me some 
mental state. But color-sighted people can go beyond such attribution. Chalmers (2003) 
distinguishes different kinds of phenomenal concepts—concepts that refer to phenom-
enally conscious experiences. Consider the case of an red experience. He distinguishes re-
10 For an argument against the claim that HOR theories are a priori true—i.e. that the transitivity princi-
ple holds with conceptual necessity see Byrne (2004).
11 I am therefore not preventing an a priori reduction (not even an a posteriori reduction)—for it might 
perfectly be the case that consciousness can be conceptually reduced to other function or state or any-
thing. It might even be the case that something along the lines of the transitivity principle is true, in so 
far as it can be unpacked in terms that do not require cognition of our own conscious experiences—see 
for example Kriegel 2009 and Sebastian 2012.
12 One last point is worth stressing. Contrary to Jackson’s argument I am not speculating about the 
knowledge a science fiction scientist might have but rather considering ordinary subjects and the cor-
rectness conditions of the mental state attribution they make before and after having the experience. 
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lational, demonstrative and pure phenomenal concepts. Among relational concepts we can 
distinguish community and individual relational concepts. The former, in the case of an ex-
perience as of red, can roughly be glossed as “the phenomenal quality typically caused in 
normal subjects within my community by paradigmatic red things” and the latter as “the 
phenomenal quality typically caused in me by paradigmatic red things” (p. 228). Moreover, 
one can refer to her experience indexically deploying a demonstrative content one might 
express by saying “this kind of experience”. Finally, there are pure phenomenal concepts in-
troduced by Chalmers as follows:
[C]onsider the knowledge that Mary gains when she learns for the first time what it is like to 
see red. She learns that seeing red has such-and-such quality in her, and in other members of her 
community. She learns (or gain the significant belief) that the experience she is now having has 
such-and-such quality, and that the quality she is now ostending is such-and-such. (p. 229)
The case of Mary is only illustrative here. As it should be clear by now, I do not want to 
commit myself to the claim that undergoing the experience is the only way one can acquire 
such concept (Swamp Mary might posses a pure phenomenal concept),13 but merely to the 
weaker claim that we acquire pure phenomenal concepts after having undergone the rele-
vant experience: a colour-blind person, at least typically, does not posses this concept.
It seems clear that a color-blind person does not make color experience attributions by 
means of an individual relational concept because there is no phenomenal quality typically 
caused in her by paradigmatic red things. Demonstrative concepts would not do the trick for 
my opponent either. The reason is that there is nothing that is demonstrated that grounds 
the deployment of the concept if there is no conscious experience. Now, the born-blind per-
son can posses at the very least a community related concept and attribute mental states un-
der such concept. The community relational concept is arguably, as Chalmers notes, what is 
deployed in the public-language. If the color-blind person can have this concept, one might 
think that one can attribute experiences under a community relational concept, and there-
fore that consciousness is not prior to our mindreading capacities. However, it is doubtful, 
to say the least, that community relational concepts are meaningful, and that they might be 
possessed if no subject in the community undergoes experiences, as my opponent is commit-
ted to maintain. More importantly, our mental mindreading abilities go beyond this. When 
I attribute my colleague a red experience I do not thereby merely deploy a community rela-
tional concept: if I were to discover that the person I am attributing the experience is color 
inverted with respect to me I would say that my attribution was wrong irrespectively on the 
kind of experience the rest of the community have in this circumstances.14
Once the assumptions of the argument are clearly spelled out, there seems to be a way in 
which one can resist the argument. One might agree that attributions of conscious experi-
ences to others require having that kind of states, and, at the same time, maintain that phe-
13 Mandik and Chalmers disagree on this point. I would like to remain neutral and endorse the weak 
reading I am presenting, for my argument does not depend on the details of their discussion.
14 If one is not moved by inverted spectrum and is willing to resist its conceptual possibility, there is em-
pirical evidence showing that normal subjects differ in the experience they undergo when looking at 
the very same object in the same situation (for a review see Block 2007. See also Nida-Rumellin 1996). 
This all that my reasoning requires.
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nomenal consciousness depends on mindreading, by distinguishing “two modes” of the min-
dreading faculty: one that relates to attribution of knowledge, desires, beliefs and perception 
and other that relates to attributions of experiences. The example above shows that some at-
tributions of mental states depend upon having conscious states; so, one possible alterna-
tive theory, not clearly in the spirit of Carruthers’ one, would maintain that our mindread-
ing faculty evolved in two steps. In a first step, one of the modes of the mindreading faculty 
would have evolved allowing our ancestors to attribute states with certain functional role (if 
we focus on perceptual states, states that track certain properties).15 If the mindreading fac-
ulty derives from the ability to theorize about others behavioral propensities—more on this 
theory-theory view of mindreading below—, then our ancestors might have developed such 
abilities without any need of getting conscious experiences involved. We can call this kind of 
faculty a “proto-mindreading” faculty, because it does not yet allow the kind of mental attri-
butions that we do. This proto-mindreading faculty can also be directed to our own behav-
ioral propensities and so we come to represent ourselves as being in certain states; thereby 
being aware of such state, and the state becoming conscious: at this point there is something 
it is like to be in such a state.16 A mental state becomes phenomenally conscious in virtue of 
being available to this proto-mindreading faculty. However, our mind reading abilities go be-
yond those of such proto-mindreading faculty, for we can also attribute phenomenally con-
scious mental states to others. So, in a second step a full-blown mindreading faculty would 
have evolved allowing the attributions of phenomenally conscious states to others.
The problem of this reply is that, according to Carruthers, the functional role that 
such a proto-mind reading faculty would attribute exhausts the phenomenal character of 
experience. The mental attributions that this proto-mindreading would allow, would be 
sufficient for explaining ours and other creatures’ behaviour. So, there is no evolutionary 
advantage in attributing phenomenally conscious mental states. However, new brain struc-
tures would be required to make such phenomenally conscious states available for our min-
dreading ability so that we can attribute conscious experiences to others, because the inputs 
for a full-blown mindreading faculty (one that allows us to attribute conscious experiences 
to others as ours does) are not merely behavioral propensities but also our own conscious 
experiences. The problem in turn is that brain tissue is metabolically expensive (Aiello 
and Wheeler 1995). Therefore, it seems reasonable to assume that the required structures 
would not be constructed and maintained unless they contribute in someway to the fitness 
of the individual. But there is no justification for the evolution of the required mechanisms 
underlying this new full-blown mindreading faculty: the proto-mindreading suffices for ex-
plaining ours and others behavior.
If this is right, then phenomenal consciousness is prior to our mindreading ability and 
not a by-product of it. The plausibility of a HOR theory will, therefore, depend on the rela-
tion of mindreading and metacognition. Such a relation is controversial.17 In the next sec-
tion, I review different models and argue that the plausibility of a model in which mind-
reading is not prior to metacognition is hardly compatible with the truth of HOR theories.
15 Or states that satisfy some isomorphic relation with the properties in our environment, what 
Rosenthal calls “qualitative states”—see fn. 8.
16 Recall that I am restricting my critics to “ambitious” theories of consciousness. See fn. 3.
17 See Carruthers (2009); Carruthers (2011) for an excellent review.
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3. The Relation between Metacognition and Mindreading
If one is interested in the relation between metacognition and mindreading there are two 
possibilities that one has to consider: either mindreading and metacognition involve inde-
pendent mechanisms or they have a common architecture.
A model in which metacognition and mindreading are independent capacities realized 
by distinct cognitive mechanisms has be proposed by Nichols and Stich (2003). This model, 
however, is not compatible with HOR views on the nature of phenomenal consciousness. 
Defenders of HOR theories can deny that phenomenal consciousness depends on mind-
reading, conceding the intuition presented in the previous section, while urging that phe-
nomenal consciousness depends on metacognition. This view is, however, incompatible with 
the view that mindreading and metacognition are independent to each other, as Nichols and 
Stich’s model suggests. The reasons are that i) the previous example suggests that phenom-
enal consciousness is a necessary condition for our mindreading ability and that ii) accord-
ing to HOR theories, metacognition is a necessary condition for phenomenal consciousness. 
These two premises entail the conclusion that metacognition is necessary for our mindread-
ing ability and both abilities cannot, therefore, involve independent mechanisms.
Contrary to the proposal by Nichols and Stich, it is commonly held that there is a 
unique mechanism for both abilities and that they are directly connected. There is, how-
ever, a huge controversy on whether metacognition is prior to mindreading (where meta-
cognition being prior to mindreading means that the ability of mindreading depends on 
the mechanisms that evolved for metacognition) or the other way around.18
Goldman (2006) suggests that metacognition is prior to mindreading. The attribution 
of mental states to others depends upon our introspective access to our own mental states 
together with processes of inference and simulation of various sorts, where a simulation is 
“the process of re-enacting or attempt to re-enact, other mental episodes.” This is what is 
known as simulation theory of mind. An example by Goldman and Shanton (2010) may 
help to illustrate the idea:
Seated in my living room on a wintry day, I might imagine myself instead watching the surf on 
some sandy beach. What I am trying to do is undergo a visual experience that matches (as closely as 
possible) a visual experience I would have if I really were on the beach. Vision science tells us that 
what transpires in visual cortex when undergoing visual imagery can, to a considerable extent, match 
what goes on during genuine vision (Kosslyn and Thompson 2000). This is what we call a mental 
simulation. This is a case of intra-personal simulation: trying to re-enact an event in one’s own mind. 
In using simulation to read others’ minds, however, one would try to re-enact their mental states. 
That’s just how mindreading characteristically takes place, according to simulation theory (ST).
18 Strawson (1959) defended on a priori reasons that, at the very least, mindreading depends on metacog-
nition. He wrote: “A necessary condition of one’s ascribing states of consciousness, experiences to one-
self, in the way one does, that one should also ascribe them, or be prepared to ascribe them, to others 
that are not oneself... One can ascribe states of consciousness to oneself only if one can ascribe them to 
others” (pp. 99-100).
  Defender of the priority of metacognition to mindreading, like Goldman, as well as other participant in 
the debate, seem not to be moved by Strawson’s arguments, which arguably rely on his views on persons; a 
view that they might not endorse. So, I will not take any stance on such a priori reasons. The kind of reply 
that I am considering here in favor of my opponent requires that a conceptual distinction between meta-
cognition and mindreading is possible and that metacognition be prior to mindreading, pace Strawson.
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The thesis that simulation plays a role in mindreading, especially “when reasoning about 
the conclusions of other people’s reasoning and decision-making processes, is now widely 
accepted. Indeed, almost all theorists, of whatever stripe (theorizing theorists and modu-
larists included), now find a place for simulation within their accounts.” (Carruthers 2011, 
225). The controversial claim of proposals like Goldman’s is that mindreading capacities 
are grounded in simulation; that is, simulative abilities come first and “whatever theoretical 
knowledge is achieved subsequently” (ibid. p. 225).
The opponent to the simulation theory is known as theory-theory. Theory-theory 
holds, roughly, that when we mindread, we access and utilize a theory of human behavior 
represented in our brains. It posits a theory of human behavior commonly known as ‘folk 
psychology’. Just like other folk theories, such as folk physics, it helps us to master our daily 
lives successfully. On this view, mindreading is essentially an exercise in theoretical reason-
ing.19 When we predict behavior, for example, we utilize folk psychology in order to reason 
from representations of the target’s past and present circumstances and behavior (includ-
ing verbal behavior), to representations of the target’s future behavior. For theory-theory, if 
there is just one mechanism, then metacognition depends on mindreading. Metacognition 
is merely the result of turning our mindreading capacities upon ourselves. In metacognition 
we just self-interpret ourselves.20
It is worth stressing at this point that defenders of the priority of mindreading fac-
ulty do not have to deny that we can access certain mental states. For example, Carruthers 
(2011) maintains that the mindreading faculty should access our sensory states:
It is obvious why the mindreading system should have access to vision and audition. For to 
interpret the intentions behind a smile, or a gesture, or a spoken phrase, the mindreading system 
would need access to perceptual representations that encode that smile, or gesture, or phrase... 
Everyone should predict, therefore, that people have transparent, non-interpretive, access to their 
own perceptual and imagistic states. (ibid. p. 51)
One might claim that this observation suggests the priority of metacognition over mind-
reading, but this suggestion arises due to the ambiguity of the meaning of the statement 
“access to our sensory states” as Byrne (2012) has pointed out. Consider a perception of 
someone’s smile. Access to this state might mean access to the information that the state 
carries—that someone is smiling—or to the information about one’s perceptual state—
19 It should be remarked that what is relevant here is whether attribution of mental states is theory-like. 
Carruthers (2011) distinguishes his “modular” ISA theory from what he calls “theorizing theories”, 
which would be committed to a theorizing account of the developmental process. This refinement is 
irrelevant for my current purposes.
20 For different interpretations of the view that mindreading is prior to metacognition see Gazzaniga 
(1995); Gazzaniga (2000); Gopnik (1993); Gopnik et al. (2004); Wilson (2002). This is the view 
endorsed by Carruthers himself. More precisely, in Carruthers (2000), where he presents his theory 
of phenomenal consciousness, he suggests that mindreading and metacognition are a unique mecha-
nism with two different modes of access, one for perception (mindreading) and one for introspection 
(metacognition). In Carruthers (2006) he gives up this view and defends the priority of mindreading. 
C arruthers (2011) presents and carefully defends the more radical view that “our mode of access to the 
non-sensory aspects of our own minds is no different in principle from our access to the mental states 
of other people”. (p. 1)
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that one sees someone smiling. It is clear that the sense in which uncontroversially mind-
reading requires access to one’s perceptual state is the first one: mindreading should have 
access to the content of our perceptual states. Metacognition entails in turn the second 
sense, which involves representations to the effect that one is in certain state.
According to HOR theories, consciousness depends on metacognition. Now, if phe-
nomenal consciousness is a necessary condition for mindreading then the thesis that mind-
reading is prior to metacognition is not compatible with HOR theories of consciousness. If 
the intuition presented in the previous section is correct, the priority of mindreading is not 
an option for HOR theories.
The only alternative available to HOR theories is that metacognition is prior to mind-
reading, endorsing some kind or other of simulation theory. The problem in this case is that 
this would, in turn, require that there had been an evolutionary pressure for metacognition; 
namely, that metacognition confers an adaptive advantage to an organism. Whereas there 
seems to be clear evolutionary advantage in mindreading for social interaction—independ-
ently on whether one thinks that the primary selection pressure has to do with enhanced ca-
pacities for cooperation (Tomasello 2008) or with “Machiavellian intelligence” (Byrne and 
Whiten 1988)—it is unclear what adaptive advantage metacognition would provide.
For instance, the claim that higher-order representation metacognition lacks biolog-
ical function seems to be endorsed by David Rosenthal, one of the main proponents of 
HOR theories (Rosenthal 1997; Rosenthal 2005). Rosenthal (2005, 2008, 2012) main-
tains that phenomenal conscious states lack biological function, because most mental 
states seem to admit unconscious versions with similar causal powers, and that a theory 
like his, which predicts that phenomenal consciousness lacks biological function, is to be 
preferred. Rosenthal (2008) offers an alternative genesis of phenomenal consciousness, in 
cases such as beliefs and desires, without ascribing any biological function to these states. 
Rosenthal appeals, however, in his explanation to our mindreading capacity and his view 
faces, therefore, my objection: phenomenal consciousness seems to be prior to our mind-
reading ability. Furthermore, Rosenthal (2012) has also suggested that higher-order repre-
sentation is a different psychological mechanism from metacognition. Two thing should 
be remarked in reply. First, as noted in footnote 3, Rosenthal provides evidence for the 
claim that not all metacognition is a higher-order representation of the kind involved, ac-
cording to the theory, in consciousness; but a reply to my argument would require that 
such higher-order representation does not depend on metacognition. This is a weaker 
claim and Rosenthal does not offer any argument against it. Second, if higher-order rep-
resentation depends on metacognition we can make sense of the claim that consciousness 
lacks biological function, for it can be a by-product of metacognition—of course, only in-
sofar as we could provide a biological function for metacognition. But, if it does not de-
pend on metacognition and lacks biological function, then, as Aiello and Wheeler argue, 
it is implausible that the new neural wirings that higher-order representations would re-
quire are constructed and maintained.21
21 Relatedly, one might suggest that metacognition is based on theory-theory and insist that metacog-
nition is prior to mindreading by arguing that we first theorize about our own mental state and then 
about those of others. However, this alternative is, I think, untenable. The advantages of being able to 
theorize about the mental states of other are overwhelming—Machiavellian reasoning for example—
in comparison with those, if any, of theorizing about our own mental states. Besides, it seems that we 
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Not all HOR theorists agree with Rosenthal. Gennaro (2004), for example, makes 
an interesting suggestion in the opposite direction in reply to Carruthers—who won-
ders in objection to actualist HOR theories: “What would have been the evolutionary 
pressure leading us to generate, routinely, a vast array of [actual] HOTs concerning the 
contents of our conscious experience?” (Carruthers (2000, 255) as quoted by Gennaro 
(2004, 51))—that might be recovered in the present debate. Gennaro, following Rolls 
(1999), proposes that “having actual HOTs allows for the correction of plans that result 
from first-order processing.” (2004, 52)22 In his own proposal, Rolls (2004) submits that 
“part of the evolutionary adaptive significance of this type of higher order thought is that 
is enables correction of errors made in first order linguistic or in non-linguistic process-
ing. Indeed, the ability to reflect on previous events is extremely important for learning 
from them, including setting up new long-term semantic structures”. Shallice (1988), for 
example, has also suggested that metacognition has evolved to supervise first-order, cog-
nitive processes.
In reply, one should first note that it is not clear that such a role requires capacities 
beyond the mindreading ones. To understand why, it is crucial to distinguish metacogni-
tion in the intended sense—as cognition about (representing) one’s own cognition—from 
other uses in cognitive sciences. The term ‘metacognition’ is sometimes used to refer to 
any process above regular cognitive processes. In this sense, any process that makes use, or 
monitors, the output of a cognitive process would count as metacognitive. In the intended 
sense, however, the relation between the metacognitive process and the cognitive one is in-
tentional or representational and not merely causal. With this distinction in hand, Carru-
thers (2009, sec. 5.1) has argued that alleged cases of ‘metacognition’ for executive monitor-
ing and control are not cases of metacognition in the intended sense—where higher-order 
representation is required. Furthermore, if metacognition had evolved for monitoring and 
control we would expect it to be able to cognitively intervene in order to improve our 
learning, because we would expect to be able to monitor and control the progress of learn-
ing. However, there is no empirical evidence to that effect, quite the opposite—see Carru-
thers (2011, ch. 9 sec. 2) for a detailed review. As Carruthers concludes:
[S]tudies of the control that people exercise over their own learning show that it is indirect 
and behavior-based, and it seems that people lack the expected native capacities to control their 
own learning. Moreover, people’s judgments about their learning are equally indirect, and are 
based on a variety of heuristics and sensorily-accessible cues...At the very least we can conclude 
that there is no support for monitoring-for-control accounts of inner sense [the priority of meta-
cognition] to be derived from the literature on human metacognition. (p. 272)
have far more behavioral evidence for others propensities than we have from ours. So, the claim that we 
theorize about our mental states by means of the same mechanism on which we theorize about those of 
others is plausible, but not so the other way around (for further discussion see Carruthers 2012). This 
lack of plausibility might explain why no one, to the best of my knowledge, has explored this line of 
reasoning in the debate about the relation between mindreading and metacognition. 
22 Gennaro proposes two further advantages of actualist theories. First, he notes that actual unconscious 
thoughts can more quickly become conscious resulting in introspective states, and even if this were 
wrong they might be thought as “a key stepping stone to the capacity for introspective consciousness”. 
It should be noted that both claims rest on the assumption that there is an adaptive advantage in intro-
specting our states—and not merely their content—and this is precisely what is at stake here.
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It has also been proposed that an evolutionary advantage for a metacognition faculty might 
be reasoning about reasoning. For example, Rolls (2004) states that “another part of the 
adaptive value of a higher order thought system may be that by thinking about its own 
thoughts in a given situation, it may be able to better understand the thoughts of another 
individual in a similar situation, and therefore predict that individual’s behavior better” 
(ibid. p. 150). This option is not very plausible in the light of the empirical research on re-
flective thinking. For, as Carruthers (2011, ch. 9 sec. 3) notes, if metacognition had evolved 
for purposes of cognitive control we would expect people to have good native capacities to 
control, troubleshoot, and improve their own reasoning process. But we seem to have very 
poor natural competence in evaluating and reasoning about our own reasoning (Bos et al. 
2008; Moshman 2004; Pillow 2002; Weinstock et al. 2004). Furthermore there are pro-
posals, like the one presented by Carruthers that show that there is no need to appeal to 
metacognition and that mindreading abilities suffice for explaining the empirical data on 
reflective thinking (ch. 9 sec. 3).
It might well be the case that metacognition had evolved for different purposes than 
those considered here but I don’t know of any alternative proposal to that of monitoring 
and control. It might had also be the case that metacognition do not evolved at all—being 
the result of a mutation or a by-product of another selected for trait. But considering the 
costs required for building and maintaining new brain mechanisms (Aiello and Wheeler, 
1995) this alternatives are not very plausible, thereby leaving HOR theories in check.
4. Conclusions
In this paper I have argued that phenomenal consciousness is a necessary condition for our 
mindreading ability. This observation jeopardizes theories that maintain that phenomenal 
consciousness is a by-product of our mindreading ability such as Carruthers’ (2000).
My objection might be extended to other HOR theories on the reasonable assumption 
that metacognition depends on mindreading. To put pressure on other HOR theories, I 
have argued that they cannot endorse the view that metacognition and mindreading are in-
dependent cognitive mechanisms. If, as I have argued, our capacity to attribute experiences 
to others does not come for free by the development of a mindreading faculty that is based 
merely on observation of behavioral propensities, then the tenability of HOR theories de-
pends on the plausibility of a functional explanation of the evolution of metacognition. I 
have offered some reasons to doubt that such an explanation will be provided.
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